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ADMINISTRATION OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES IN LIGHT
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Referring to a portion of to'wn or a segment of society as being "on
the other side of the tracks" has for too long been a familiar expression
to most Americans."

Disparities in the quality of human existence have been present

throughout civilized societies whenever men have assembled, forming
urban communities. The larger and more established these communities

have become, the more pronounced have become the social disparities
which separate their citizenry.2 Much of this social division is attributable to the age-old economic differences betveen the "haves" and the
"have nots"-differences accentuated by the complexities of modern
urban life. However, with the modernization and increase of all varieties

of municipal services, 3 it has become clear that those "on the other side
of the tracks" often do not enjoy the same measure of services as do their

more affluent fellow citizens. The charge has arisen with increasing frequency that inherent social and economic disparities have been ratified
1

Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1287 (5th Cir. 1971). See p. 148 infra.
2 It can now be said with certainty that social disparities in America have evolved to
the point of unprecedented domestic crisis. The Detroit riot of July, 1967-in which
43 persons died, 386 were injured and 6,892 were arrested-shocked the national conscience and brought into perspective the perplexity of the problem. Mayor Jerome P.
Cavanagh, in commenting upon the tragedy in his city, noted:
It is important to point out in any analysis of America's urban crisis that the
Detroit riot was not an isolated event of vengeance against a single community
but part of a national epidemic of despair and discontent. In 1967 alone, there
were at least 150 outbreaks of violence in more than 120 cities. At least 118 people
were killed and nearly 4,000 injured. Undoubtedly, a great deal of purposeful,
overt criminality was involved in the rioting, but the root causes are more deeply
If I were to offer any prescription for
imbedded in alienation and neglect ....
our urban ills it would be that we now embark to eliminate any injustice that might
hold back any man, of any race, of any description-injustices in law, in housing,
in education, in employment opportunity, in acceptability.
Cavanagh, Injustice and Urban Ills, 19 VA. L. W u.yLy, DICTA 66, 69 (1968).
The purpose of this Comment will be to highlight still another injustice symptomatic
of a deeper urban malaise-discriminatory administration of municipal services.
3 An example of services offered by some modern municipalities would be construction and maintenance of streets, curbing and sidewalks, street lights, surface water
drainage, sewers, public transportation, garbage collection, public housing and public
recreational facilities. Generally, municipal services may be classified "as things necessary
and things convenient," the latter making possible a more complete enjoyment of city
life. 1 E. McQummix, THE LAw oF MUmcIPAL Comor-ATONS § 1.115 (3d ed. 1949).
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and, indeed, perpetuated by discriminatory administration of these services by public officials. The degree to which urban dwellers are entitled
to equality in municipal services is, consequently, an issue in need of definition.
I.

HISTORICAL JUDICIAL TREATMENT

There has been prevalent a judicial reluctance to intervene when the
4
exercise of discretionary duties by municipal officers was challenged.
This hesitancy reflects blind adherence to the basic governmental scheme
of separation of powers, whereby the power of the judicial branch to
substitute its mandate for executive or legislative action has been limited.
Within this scheme, details of municipal administration are entrusted to
elected officials by the public and not to the courts. Proponents of uninhibited discretion in public officials for the distribution of municipal
services advance their argument on two grounds: that scanty tax revenues necessitate establishing priorities with respect to such services, and
that effective municipal government demands the flexibility to react and
initiate innovative measures. It is contended by these advocates that judicial review must be restricted as local government alone is able to cope
with the exigencies of urban life.6
Nevertheless, conditions in modern urban centers disclose that the
grant of administrative authority by the public to elected officials can
be, and often is, abused. The concept of separation of powers presup4

See, e.g., Stribling v. Mailliard, 6 Cal. App. 3d 470, 85 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1970); Arbour
Park Civic Ass'n v. City of Newark, 267 A.2d 904 (Del. 1970); Hoffman v. City of
Stillwater, 461 P.2d 944 (Okla. 1969); Weber v. City of Philadelphia, 437 Pa. 179, 262
A.2d 297 (1970).
"[Flair latitude should be allowed by the court to the legislative body to generate
new and imaginative mechanisms addressed to municipal problems. 'Novelty is no
argument against constitutionality." 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124,
261 N.E.2d 647, 651, 313 N.Y.S.2d 733, 738, appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 962 (1970).
5The organizational approach outlined by the decision of People ex rel. Clapp v.
Listman, 84 App. Div. 633, 82 N.Y.S. 784, 786 (1903) has been rearticulated by numerous
modern cases:
The interference of the Supreme Court with the details of municipal administration is not to be encouraged. These details are entrusted by the people to officers
,chosen directly or indirectly by themselves. These officers are criminally responsible for a willful neglect of their duties, and upon them the responsibility for
the government of our cities should usually be allowed to rest.
The Supreme Court is not so organized as to enable it conveniently to assume
a general supervisory power over their acts; and, indeed, such an assumption by
it would be contrary to the whole spirit and intent of our government.
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poses a system of checks and balances 7 Judicial review of abusive state
or municipal power is, therefore, not precluded and should include matters vital to public well-being, such as the allocation of municipal services. The financial plight of urban areas has been well documented and
publicized,8 as has been the squalor of life in urban slums. Without doubt,
responsive elected representatives are best able to balance these divergent
conditions so as to insure an equitable implementation of services with
the resources at hand. Yet, abuses of power are inevitable, demanding
the formation of judicial guidelines in this area-guidelines which will
not prove unduly restrictive while having the much desired effect of restoring public confidence in municipal government.
II. POTENTIAL FouNDATiONS FOR REVIEW
Two theories can be advanced to support granting relief to urbanites
who are deprived of equal enjoyment of municipal services: breach of
a public trust and violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Breach of Public Trust
When a municipal official assumes his representative position, it could
be said that he assumes as well the capacity of trustee of the public welfare." Certainly, such officials control the allocation of tax revenues and,
Fm_ a isT No. 48 (J. Madison).
8 An inflationary economy has tended to neutralize any increases in municipal revenues
while, concurrently, demands for expanded service, most notably welfare, have continued. State and federal aid has, for the most part, failed to make up the variance, and
municipalities across the country face the unprecedented contingency of bankruptcy.
Cleveland and Newark are two cities on the brink of economic collapse.
9Courts, called upon to determine whether public officials have any legally enforceable
property rights in their offices, have often supported the conclusion that public office
is not conferred by contract by noting that public office is a public trust to which
compensation is merely incident. See, e.g., Taylor v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548, 577
(1900); Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 245 A.2d 579, 587 (1968); State ex rel. Stage v.
Mackie, 82 Conn. 398, 74 A. 759, 761 (1909); Tuscan v. Smith, 130 Me. 36, 153 A. 289
(1931); Fellows ex rel. Cummings v. Eastman, 126 Me. 147, 136 A. 810, 812 (1927); State
ex rel. Nagle v. Sullivan, 98 Mont. 425, 40 P.2d 995 (1935); State ex rel. Gordon v.
Barthalow, 150 Ohio St. 499, 83 N.E.2d 393 (1948); Hull v. City of Cleveland, 79 Ohio
App. 87, 70 N.E.2d 137, 138 (1946).
Public officers are created for the purpose of effecting the end for which
government has been instituted .... In our form of government it is fundamental
that a public office is a public trust, or "a public charge or employment'j"'and nota vested property 'right....
3 E. McQtmLIN, THE LAw oF Mumc'A.L Coa, oRAtnoNs § 12.29, at 164-65 (3d ed. 1949).

7THE
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to a limited degree, the application of expanding federal aid to cities and
localities. These funds form the corpus of a public trust, 0 created by
the machinery of municipal government to benefit the individual residents. It should follow, necessarily, that a discriminatory distribution
of municipal services" would constitute a breach of the public trust for
which a suit in equity will lie to afford relief 12 to the deprived citizens,
the intended beneficiaries.
To bolster this approach, an analogy can be drawn to the fiduciary
responsibilities of corporate business officers toward individual shareholders. The law of business corporations has evolved from the mere
acknowledgement of fiduciary duties of officers and directors owed to
the corporation, to a modern, expanded view of fiduciary duties owed
the individual shareholder as well." The municipality is itself, conceptually, a corporation 14 and the same judicial standard could logically be
applied to municipal officials as is applied to corporate officers and normal
trustees. If municipal officers abuse their discretion by a disproportionate allocation of funds or services, this should be perceived as a breach
of fiduciary duty to the detriment of individual citizens.' 5 Consequently,
the courts should then make available the traditional equitable remedies
for breach of trust.16
B. Violation of Equal Protection
While there is no constitutional necessity for a municipality to pro10 A trust relationship need not be expressly set forth to be recognized by the courts.
When taxes are collected subject to authorized expenditures by municipal officials it
could be said that a constructive trust results even though the taxpayers had no such
intention in paying their taxes. For a distinction between express and constructive trusts
see 5 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 462.1 (3d ed. 1967).
11 In the distribution of the public cestui que trust to the public "trustees," both black

and white, municipal officials would be held to the standard of loyalty, fairness and
impartiality. 2 A. ScOTT, THE LAW OF TRusTS §§ 164, 170, 183 (3d ed. 1967). Further
restrictions supporting a right of action by deprived citizens might be found in local
city. and municipal charters.
12 3 A. SCOTT, TmE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 205-15 (3d ed. 1967).

13 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939); Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co.
v, Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 318-19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 US. 885 (1959); Perlman v.
Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
14 1 E. McQuiLLiN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 2.23-52 (3d ed. 1949).
15 With regard to the standing of an individual citizen to sue municipal officers to
enforce public duties, see Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The NonHobfeldian or ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
16 See note 12 supra.
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vide services to its citizens, once it elects to do so, services must be administered on a nondiscriminatory basis.' 7 A more comprehensive and
promising approach to enforcement of the citizen's right to equality in
municipal services would be by application of the Equal Protection
Clause. The requisites of state action' and justiciability"9 provide no
substantial obstacle.
Although it has been argued that judicial intervention in this area is
precluded as a nonjusticiable "political question," 20 the decision in Baker
v. Ca-rr2 ' redefined the political question controversy. The Supreme
Court established in Baker that a finding of justiciability would hinge on
whether there existed "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for resolution of the issue and, on whether the issue might more
properly be resolved by "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion." 22 Viable judicial standards would be feasible
in review of administration of municipal services without jeopardizing
the discretion of municipal officials, just as such standards have been
established in the vastly more complex area of reapportionment.2 The
17 Application of constitutional safeguards does not necessitate that a statute or
activity of the state be expressly authorized by the Constitution. A contrary holding
would serve either to strip constitutional provisions of any protectionary effect or to
rob the Constitution of the flexibility that has assured its survival. See, e.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare assistance, not a constitutional right, must be
applied consistent with equal protection); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (same
logic applied to wrongful death action); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (appellate
review for convicted felons must not discriminate against impoverished defendants).
18 See p. 146 infra.
1 See pp. 145-46 infra.
20 The judiciary has been hesitant, if not unwilling, to determine issues political in
nature-that is, when the matter in controversy might concern the legitimate exercise of
discretion on the part of a public official. See note 5 supra.
21369 U.S. 186 (1962).
22 The Supreme Court set forth the following requisites, any one of which could
support a finding of a nonjusticiable political issue:
a.) A constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
b.) A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
c.) The obvious need for an initial policy determination by a nonjudicial body;
d.) The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
e.) An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made;
f) The potential embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. Id. at 217.
23 The "reapportionment cases" have been most pronounced in the application of the
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most obvious standard, of course, would be the quality of services enjoyed by those citizens who are favored by discriminatory practices.
Any variation from that same quality of service would require further
judicial scrutiny to determine whether the classification among citizens
is rationally based. Whatever the standard, a check on municipal abuse
of discretion within the framework of equal protection of the laws
should not be found to be an infringement of separation of governmental
powers."
As regards state action, it is well established that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies only to "state action" or action taken under color
of state authority." Although state action is of declining significance as
a necessity for constitutional safeguards, 26 it is still true that, theoretically, the contention of "no state action" is the last bastion on which advocates of de facto discrimination might stand. 27 The state action concept has been broadened to include "creatures" of the states when their
function has been governmental in nature.28 It follows that actions by
municipal officials relating to the public welfare clearly fall within the
ambit of state action. Judicial review should not be limited merely to
affirmative activities of municipal government, however. Municipal inaction in response to discrimination in public institutions, thereby enBaker standard. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
24 Contra, Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897
(1968) (failure to supply police protection). But see p. 148 infra.
2
5Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
16 (1958); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.. 1

(1948).
26 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). See also
Note, The Strange Career of "State Action" Under the Fifteenth Amendment, 74 YAmE

L.J. 1448 (1965).
27 See Black, Foreword: The Supreme Court 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 70
(1967).
28 The Supreme Court in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) stated in an

unequivocal manner:
Although the forms and functions of local government and the relationships

among the various units are matters of state concern, it is now beyond question
that a State's political subdivisions must comply with the Fourteenth Amendment.
The actions of local government are the actions of the State. A city, town, or

county may no more deny the equal protection of the laws than it may abridge
freedom of speech, establish an official religion, arrest without probable cause, or
deny due process of law. Id.-at 480.
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couraging further discrimination, is also violative of the Equal Protection
ClauseY
IIl.

EVOLUTION OF AN EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARD

The traditional equal protection test demanded only that the state action in controversy, be it legislation or municipal activity, bear some rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose 0 Yet, the Supreme
Court has altered the standard when a racial classification is made among
32
citizens.al The Court in McLaughlin v. Florida,
while ruling upon the
constitutionality of a Florida statute which prohibited cohabitation between a Negro and white person, determined that equal protection of
the laws is not satisfied merely by a demonstration of equal application
of a statute among class members singled out by the statuteas Rather,
it is to be adjudged whether "the classifications drawn in a statute are
reasonable in light of its purpose." .4 Racial classifications are, in general,
"constitutionally suspect" 35 and should, as a result, be subjected to the
"most rigid scrutiny." 36
Such a law (based on racial classification) ... bears a heavy burden of
justification . . . and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not
merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy.3 7
29

Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir.

1968).
3

0Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Tigner v. Texas, 310 US. 141
(1940).
31 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529,
537 (5th Cir. 1968).
32 379 U.S. 184 (1964).

33 Id. at 191.
34 Id. Mr. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, expressed his belief that even
this standard was not broad enough. "... . I cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose
under our Constitution for a state law which makes the color of a person's skin the test
of whether his conduct is a criminal offense." Id. at 198.
35 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
36 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
The Supreme Court has also stated that a classification of citizens on the basis of
wealth should evoke more exacting judicial scrutiny. McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
37 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
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The more rigid equal protection standard was successfully employed
recently in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw38 to review allocation of municipal services. The Hawkins decision viewed the racially discriminatory

provision of such services violative of the rigid standard and, consequently, granted injunctive relief to Negro citizens under 42 U.S.C.
§1983. s Undisputed statistical evidence was presented which reflected
".... a substantial qualitative and quantitative inequity in the level and
nature of services accorded 'white' and 'black' neighborhoods in

Shaw." 40 Noting that "figures speak, and when they do, Courts listen,"
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found a clear prima facie case
of racial discrimination.

41

In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's
decision, 42 which had applied the traditional equal protection standard
in denying relief. The trial court began its analysis by recognizing that

discretion in allocating public services properly belongs in municipal officials,43 and that, in the absence of contrary evidence, there exists a presumption that public officers are honest and will carry out their obligations in good faith. 44 Conceding that the town of Shaw was not one of
the more liberal in the nation, the trial court concluded, nonetheless, that
38 437

F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).

39 The so-called Civil Rights Act reads as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The extent to which municipalities can be held liable under § 1983 was decided by the
Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). It was established that a
municipality is a "person" under § 1983 for purposes of injunctive relief. However, the
Supreme Court concluded that this provision had not been enacted with the intention
of providing a private litigant a course of action for damages against a municipality.
See Harkiess v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1963); 70 COLuM. L. REv. 1467 (1970).
40 437 F.2d at 1288.
411d.
42 Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
43 The District Court set the tone of its decision with the statement that

"...

de-

termination of the necessity and character of public improvements, the matter of their
construction and the priority of accomplishment, ordinarily, are questions to be resolved
'by officials, usually elected, who constitute the governing authority of the municipality."
Id. at 1167.
44 Id.
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the disparities in municipal services in Shaw could be explained in terms
of legitimate public interests.
If actions of public officials are shown to have rested upon rational
considerations, irrespective of race or poverty, they are not within the
condemnation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and may not be properly condemned upon judicial review. Persons or groups who are
treated differently must be shown to be similarly situated and their unequal treatment demonstrated to be without any rational basis or based
upon an invidious factor such as race.45
This application of the "traditional" equal protection standard in the
trial court actually hinged on the factual determination by the court that
"rational considerations" did exist, sufficient to justify the differences in
services enjoyed by citizens of Shaw. The proper forum for an expression of discontent with the quality of municipal services was suggested
4
to be the ballot box. 6
Reversal by the Fifth Circuit in the Hawkins case and the subsequent
granting of relief were founded upon the contrary conclusion that there
existed no compelling state interests inherent in the administration of
these services so as to validate the obvious racial classification made by
the responsible officials.47 The town of Shaw could not sustain the
"heavy burden of justification" required under the rigid equal protection
standard employed whenever classifications among citizens are founded
on suspect traits, such as race. 48 No overriding governmental objective
45M. at 1168. See also Davis v. Georgia State Bd. of Educ., 408 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir.
1969).
46303 F. Supp. at 1169.
47Evidence presented by the record which prompted the inescapable conclusion of
racial classification in the expenditure of municipal services, was as follows: over 97%
of those who lived in homes located on unpaved streets were black; no high intensity
mercury vapor street lights were installed in black neighborhoods, whereas the superior
lighting fixtures were found only in white residential areas; 20% of the black residents
received no sanitary sewer service, while 99% of the white residents were served; many
streets in the black residential areas had inadequate drainage ditch systems, whereas no
comparable problem existed in white communities; the water pressure to two black
neighborhoods, constituting 63% of the town's black population, was substandard because these areas were served by 2" or 1V4" water mains, while most of the white
population was served by 6" mains.
Faced with the severity of these figures, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that "[tihe only question that remains to be examined is whether or not these disparities
can possibly be justified by any compelling state interests:' 437 F.2d at 1288.
48 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192,196 (1964).
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was presented, to the satisfaction of the court, so as to obviate equal protection safeguards. 49
There was no finding of bad faith on the part of Shaw's public officials,
but such a finding was immaterial." A showing of good intentions in
distribution of services is no justification when a discriminatory classification results.51 Nor may elected officials avoid their responsibilities to
the entire citizenry by claiming to represent, through disproportionate
allocation of services, the will of the majority of their constituents.5 2 It
is now firmly recognized ". . . that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme." r3
IV.

CONCLUSION

The impact of the more rigid equal protection standard in the field
of municipal services and the increased willingness of the courts to implement it, reflected by the Hawkins decision, could serve to revolutionize municipal administration, thereby aggravating further the fiscal dilemma under which local governments presently suffer. Indubitably, as
governmental services are expanded seeking to improve the quality of
human existence, litigation of the Hawkins variety will accompany this
growth.
49 437 F.2d at 1289-91.

[Tlhe record contains no direct evidence aimed at establishing bad faith, ill
will or an evil motive on the part of the Town of Shaw and its public officials.
We feel, however, that the law on this point is clear. In a civil rights suit alleging
racial discrimination in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, actual intent
or motive need not be directly proved . . . . Id. at 1291-92.
51 The Supreme Court in the landmark decision in Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny, has made it clear that a deliberate policy to
separate the races cannot be justified by the good intentions with which other laudable
goals are pursued.
As regards motive and municipal discriminatory policies, see Kennedy Park Homes
Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970); Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
Orthodox equal protection doctrine can be encapsulated in a single rule:
government action which without justification imposes unequal burdens or awards
unequal benefits is unconstitutional. The complaint that analytically no violation
of equal protection vests unless the inequalities stem from a deliberately discriminatory plan is simply false.
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967).
2 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. InI. 1969).
53 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967). While the Hobson decision
involves segregation in education rather than discrimination in municipal services, it
provides an excellent discussion of the evolving equal protection standard.
50
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Unfortunately, many questions remain unanswered by the Hawkins
ruling. The degree of difficulty and expense in gathering sufficient statistical data to prove a prima facie case of discriminatory classification, and
the validity of specially assessing affluent white residents for additional
services while not improving the quality of general services, are issues
yet to be resolved-issues which will bear on the long term significance
of Hawkins. At the very least, Hawkins represents another step in a
growing judicial tendency to control abuse of power in areas once
thought exclusive of judicial influence. The necessity for such control
cannot be denied, and it is suggested that the equal protection standard
applied in Hawkins meets this need while affording municipal officials
necessary operative flexibility.

C.F.W.

